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ABSTRACT
In anticipation of a future social interaction, socially anxious individuals
(SAIs) may imagine themselves appearing stupid or foolish and predict and
exaggerate the probability and costs of conveying these undesirable social
images both on oneself (e.g., “I will feel stupid”) and on others impressions of
oneself (e.g., “Others will think I’m stupid”). However, there is a paucity of
research examining the latter bias; moreover, research regarding SAIs estimates
of the probability and costs of conveying a positive impression (e.g., “I will feel
smart”) has typically been neglected. Thus, the a novel questionnaire was
created in order to develop a more comprehensive model of SAIs estimates of
probability and costs. We expected that positive and negative, self- and otherrelated judgments will represent four distinct, latent constructs that will be related
to trait social anxiety indirectly through fears of positive and negative evaluation
per the evolutionary model of social anxiety. Structural equation modeling was
used to test study hypotheses. The final sample included four hounded and
seventy-four college students (307 males and 167 females). Results generally
supported study hypotheses. After minor theoretically justified modifications, the
hypothesized model provided good fit to the data, χ2(94) = 151.78, CFI = .99, TLI
= .99, RMSEA = .04. All social appraisals with the exception of other-negative
appraisals were indirectly related to social anxiety through fears of positive and
negative evaluation. Contrary to expectations, other-positive appraisals were
negatively related to fear of negative evaluation and other-negative appraisals
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were uncorrelated with fear of positive evaluation, providing partial incremental
validity of the novel questionnaire used in this study. Results provide preliminary
evidence that suggests future research should extend evaluation of SAIs
anticipatory social appraisals beyond negative, self-related social impact.
Implications, limitations, and future directions of the research are be discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Cognitive models assert that social anxiety is maintained by biased
information processing, including biases in attention towards threat-related social
cues, more negative and less positive interpretations of ambiguous social
situations, and judgment biases involving exaggerated estimates of the
probability and cost of negative social situations (Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001;
Hirsch & Clark, 2004). In regards to the latter cognitive bias, cognitive models of
anxiety posit that specific judgmental biases may exist across the range of
anxiety disorders, and may play a causal role in their development and
persistence (e.g., Beck Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Clark &
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).
Indeed, although conventional wisdom argues that our emotions directly
cause our behavior (e.g., anxiety causes avoidance), it is often our judgments of
future events that have implications for what we pursue and what we avoid (see,
Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). As a result, from a cognitivebehavioral standpoint, socially anxious individuals’ anticipatory judgmental biases
may be one of the more important cognitive mechanisms through which social
anxiety is maintained. Research has shown that socially anxious individuals
(SAIs) overestimate the probability and costs of negative social events (e.g., Foa,
Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996). That is, compared to non-anxious controls
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(NACs), SAIs estimate that a negative social event will be more likely to occur
and have dramatically greater negative consequences if it were to actually
happen.
Moreover, treatment studies have established that one of the mechanisms
of change for cognitive-behavioral treatments for social anxiety are reductions in
probability and cost estimates (e.g., Hoffman, 2004; Foa et al, 1996; Gregory,
Peters, Abbott, Gaston & Rapee, 2015). However, most studies of inflated
probability and cost estimates have primarily examined SAIs estimates of the
impact of negative social events upon oneself (e.g., Foa et al., 1996; Uren,
Szabo, & Lovibond, 2004; Nelson, Deacon, Lickel, & Sy, 2010) and not SAIs’
estimates of the impact the social event would have on other peoples’
perceptions of oneself. Additionally, these studies have also typically neglected
the assessment of SAIs’ probability and cost estimates of anticipated positive
social events/outcomes. Because of these limitations in previous studies, I argue
that research has failed to adequately address the comprehensive nature of
SAI’s judgmental biases.

Self and Other’s Perceptions of Oneself
When socially anxious individuals anticipate a future social interaction they
typically engage in anticipatory processing that consists largely of negative selfimages, and thoughts of how they will be perceived by others (Clark & Wells,
1995, Hinrischsen and Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 2005). To infer how they will
be viewed by others, SAIs engage in self-focused attention, erroneously relying
2

upon their own emotions and bodily sensations to infer what others are thinking
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Clark, 2001). For instance, a socially anxious individual
who is ridden with anxiety and self-doubt in anticipation of a speech may use this
self-induced anxiety and doubt to infer that others will perceive them as
incompetent or unintelligent. This suggests that when SAIs anticipate a social
interaction, they not only anticipate the impact that the social outcome would
have on oneself (e.g., “I am going to appear incompetent and I will feel like a
stupid person”), but also the impact that the social outcome would have on others
perception of oneself (e.g., “I am going to appear incompetent and people will
think I’m a stupid person) (Clark & Wells, 1995; Alden & Taylor, 2004, 2010;
Taylor & Alden, 2008).
Judgmental Biases of Oneself
Supporting the existence of self-related judgmental biases, Foa, Franklin,
Perry, and Herbert (1996) examined the probability and cost estimates of
negative social and non-social situations among a group of individuals diagnosed
with generalized social phobia (GSP) and non-anxious controls (NACs). The
researchers also examined the effectiveness of a cognitive behavioral treatment
for reducing probability and cost estimates. Fifteen individuals who, according to
DSM-III-R criteria, were diagnosed with GSP were recruited for the study. Any
participant meeting criteria for major depression, substance abuse or
dependence, a history of psychotic disorder or the presence of another anxiety
disorder was excluded from the study.
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A questionnaire consisting of participants probability and cost estimates of
20 negative socially irrelevant events (e.g., “You will lose your house keys”) and
20 negative socially relevant events (e.g., “During a job interview, you will
freeze”; “Someone you know won’t say hello to you”) was administered. All four
scales demonstrated high internal consistency. The participants also received
14-week group cognitive-behavioral therapy for social anxiety consisting of
exposure, cognitive restructuring and social skills training. Matched t-tests
between pre and post treatment scores revealed large effect sizes on measures
of social anxiety and depression, indicating that the treatment was effective in
reducing social anxiety. Moreover, at pretreatment, SAIs rated negative social
situations as more costly and probable compared to NACs. Results indicated that
SAIs had higher probability estimates at pre and post-treatment for social events
compared to nonsocial events, but that social estimates of probability and cost
decreased from pre to post-treatment, revealing a large effect.
Although the previous study was conducted with a small sample (n = 15),
subsequent research has found similar results (e.g., Uren, Szabo, & Lovibond,
2004; Nelson et al., 2010; Taylor & Alden, 2008; Trew & Alden, 2009;
Moscovitch, Rodebaguh & Hesch, 2012; Moscovitch, Waechter, Bielak, Rowa &
McCabe, 2015). For instance, SAIs tend to overestimate the negative impact of
imagined social mishaps on oneself (e.g., appearing anxious or clumsy;
Moscovitch, Rodebaugh & Hesch, 2012), this finding has also extended to
individuals diagnosed with social anxiety disorder who have been shown to
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exaggerate the costs of imagined social mishaps compared to both anxious and
non-anxious controls (Moscovitch, Waechter, Bielak, Rowa & McCabe, 2015).
These studies, however, did not assess SAI’s probability and costs estimates of
others’ perceptions of oneself.
Judgmental Biases of Others’ Perceptions
There is reason to believe that, in addition to inflated probability and cost
estimates on oneself, SAIs also have inflated estimates of a social events impact
on others’ perceptions of oneself. The nature of social anxiety is such that it can
be conceptualized as a fear of the self as a social object for others. That is,
cognitive and evolutionary models of social anxiety propose that SAIs may have
an underlying fear that one is an aversive social object for others and will thus
evoke negative evaluation and resulting loss of interest and ostracism, etc. (Clark
& Wells, 1995; Gilbert, 2001; Trower & Gilbert, 1989; Moscovitch, 2009). Indeed,
research has revealed that decreases in SAIs anticipatory estimates of cost on
others perceptions correlates with reductions in social anxiety (Taylor & Alden,
2008). Furthermore, reductions in the extent to which SAIs evaluations of
themselves were dependent on feedback from others was also associated with
treatment outcome. These findings provide evidence for the existence of SAIs
exaggerated anticipatory judgements of others perceptions, but the clinical
literature lacks additional research in this area.
However, findings from the social psychology literature on the spotlight
effect provide a possible explanation of why SAIs may anticipate exaggerated
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reactions from others. Research on the spotlight effect suggests that people
overestimate how much other people pay attention to their external appearance
(Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 2000). In other words, people tend to think they
are in the spotlight when, in fact, they are not. For example, when, on a
particularly hasty day, one has spilled coffee on their shirt, the appearance of the
light brown stain is perceived to be exaggeratedly apparent to others as one
walks into their morning meeting.
To study this spotlight effect, Gilovich, Savitky, and Medvec (2000)
recruited one hundred and nine unselected undergraduate students. These
participants were asked to walk into a room with an embarrassing shirt on (e.g.,
with a picture of a dated pop-star prominently displayed) and make estimates of
the number of people who noticed their shirt. This estimate was then compared
with the actual number of people who noticed the shirt. Results indicated that,
compared to the actual estimates, the person wearing the embarrassing shirt
overestimated the number who noticed the shirt. The researchers found the
same effect when participants were asked to wear a shirt of their choice,
suggesting that this effect generalizes to non-embarrassing situations.
Importantly, the spotlight effect was found to exist for positive behavioral acts of
self-presentation as well. Groups of three to seven participants were asked to
engage in a group discussion and estimate their advancement of the group
discussion, and the amount of remarkable comments they made as seen by
others. Again, the researchers found that people overestimated the extent to
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which others noticed one’s contributions to the group. This suggests that the
spotlight effect occurs in both positive and negative social situations.
Additional findings suggest an illusion of transparency or the tendency for
people to feel that their internal thoughts and feelings (e.g., self-doubt, anxiety)
are seen by others more than they actually are (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky,
1998). For example, participants overestimate the extent to which others would
detect their lies. This finding has been shown to generalize to emotions of
disgust, in which participants were asked to taste a series of foul-tasting drinks
and maintain an as neutral impression as possible. Nonetheless, participants
overestimated the extent to which their disgust was detected by observers.
Researchers have hypothesized on the proximal cause of these overestimations.
The spotlight effect and the illusion of transparency have been proposed
to stem from an anchoring and adjustment process wherein people anchor on
their current emotional state to judge others perceptions. However, people
typically recognize that other people are not as likely to be as focused on their
presence as is oneself and adjust for this accordingly (Gilovich et al., 1998,
2000). This adjustment is typically insufficient and results in an overestimation of
others perceptions of oneself. For instance, if participants wearing the
embarrassing shirt were given time to habituate to the shirt and thus were less
focused on the shirt, participant’s estimates were less biased compared to actual
estimates. Furthermore, the illusion of transparency has been shown to manifest
only in situations in which one is experiencing particularly pronounced internal
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experiences, such as lying, and tasting a foul-tasting drink (Gilovich, Medvec, &
Savitsky, 1998). In contrast, the illusion of transparency is not found among less
pronounced internal experiences, such as telling the truth and tasting a pleasant
tasting drink. This is also consistent with the anchoring and adjustment
explanation in that when experiencing less intense emotions participants’
adjustments are made from a minor emotional anchor resulting in a less biased
estimation of others perceptions. How is the anchoring and adjustment
explanation relevant to SAIs estimates of others perceptions?
As individuals tend to anchor on their current emotional state and adjust
accordingly, the heightened emotional arousal of SAIs may result in particularly
biased adjustments due to a higher emotional anchor, augmented by heightened
self-focused attention. Thus SAIs may not only overestimate the costs of
negative social situations, they may also overestimate the costs on others
perceptions of oneself. Consistent with this idea is research on Theory of Mind
(ToM), indicating that when theorizing about others’ mental states, SAIs attribute
more meaning and intensity to others emotional states and thoughts that are
disproportionate to the context (Washburn, Wilson, Roes, Rnic, and Harkness
(2016; Hezel & McNally, 2014). Moreover, previous research (Brown & Stopa,
2007) has shown that SAIs in situations of high social evaluation exhibit elevated
levels of a spotlight effect compared to SAIs in a situation of low social
evaluation.
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This was tested by a modified version of a measure that assesses public
and private self-awareness. In the high social-evaluative condition participants
performed a memory task while they were knowingly videotaped and were told
that their performance would be evaluated later by experts. In the low socialevaluative condition participants were secretly videotaped. Thirty participants in
each condition were recruited based on cut off scores on the brief fear of
negative evaluation scale. The researchers measured the spotlight effect and
illusion of transparency by comparing participants rating of their own public and
private self-awareness with the assessors. Results suggested that the spotlight
effect was present under high social-evaluative condition compared to low,
whereas the illusion of transparency did not differ across conditions. Socially
anxious individuals in the high social-evaluative condition were more anxious and
thus began from a higher emotional anchor when attempting to adjust for
estimates of others perceptions.
These findings suggest that SAIs are particularly prone to the spotlight
effect, but only in certain social conditions (e.g., highly visible and evaluative
social situations) and that the illusion of transparency was present across social
situations and thus may reflect more of a stable trait. Accordingly, if SAIs
overestimate their positive reactions to positive social events, this same
insufficient adjustment may occur when SAIs are asked to estimate the costs of
positive social situations on others perceptions of oneself. However, research in
this area is sparse.
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Judgmental Biases of Positive Social Events
Although research supports the idea that SAIs overestimate the probability
and costs of conveying a negative, undesirable impression to others, the
question remains, do SAIs also overestimate the probability and costs of
conveying a positive, desirable impression to others (e.g., “If I make a funny joke,
everybody will think I’m an enjoyable person to be around and will want to hang
out with me”)? While cognitive models assert that, when anticipating a social
interaction, SAIs typically hold a negative image of themselves as they appear to
others (e.g., looking boring or anxious), it seems reasonable to assume that there
are times when SAIs do actually anticipate conveying a desired image to others
(e.g., appearing funny or confident) as opposed to a negative, undesirable one.
This is because these cognitive models also suggest that SAIs are highly
motivated to convey a desired impression, although they may feel uncertain in
doing so (Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Clark & Wells, 1995, Rapee & Heimberg,
1997; Hoffman, 2007). Additionally, SAIs have been shown to value themselves
based upon others’ appraisals (Alden & Taylor, 2008); that is, their sense of self
may depend largely on others’ perceptions. Thus, one possible explanation for
the existence of exaggerated positive judgmental biases is that, when
anticipating making a desirable impression, SAIs may overestimate the
probability and cost of this desirable impression due to the value this may bring
to their sense of self.
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Research on SAIs probability and cost estimates of future positive social
situations has been mixed. Indirect evidence comes from Bielak and Moscovitch
(2013) who had female SAIs imagine a hypothetical social interaction with a
visibly confident (e.g., relaxed, strong, clear voice) male social partner. Results
indicated that, compared to individuals low in social anxiety, SAIs had higher
positive impressions of this confident partner in that they rated him as possessing
higher amounts of desirable characteristics, such as ambition, happiness,
achievement, and intelligence. These findings suggest that, if SAIs were to
anticipate conveying such qualities themselves (e.g., appearing visibly confident
to others), SAIs may overestimate the extent to which they, themselves, and
others would react positively to such conveyed desirable qualities.
In support of this notion, Gilboa-Schectman, Franklin and Foa (2000)
directly assessed SAIs, non-anxious controls (NACs) and individuals diagnosed
with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) anticipated reactions to positive and
negative social scenarios on a variety of outcomes/domains including,
probability, magnitude, duration, strength of bodily reactions and changes in selfesteem. The researchers argued that previous research on judgmental biases
entailed SAIs appraisals of neutral or moderate negative social events. Thus the
differences between SAIs and NACs could possibly be due to SAIs tendency to
interpret social events more negatively and consequently overestimate the
corresponding social costs of these social events.
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To rule out this interpretation bias, these researchers used unambiguous
positive and negative social events. A factor analysis confirmed that the
questionnaire consisted of three factors, positive and negative impact factors
(magnitude, duration, bodily reaction, self-esteem) and a probability factor. The
results of the factors scores indicated that SAIs had exaggerated expectations of
emotional reactions to both negative and positive social events, compared to
NACs and OCDs. However, SAIs did report stronger expectations for the impact
of negative social events compared to positive social events with NACs reporting
the opposite pattern. Specifically, SAIs overestimated the magnitude, duration,
bodily reaction and change in self-esteem in reaction to negative social events
relative to both OCDs and NACs. For positive events, SAIs overestimated the
duration, bodily reaction and increase in self-esteem relative to their OCD and
NAC counterparts.
In contrast, Vassilopoulos (2006) had individuals high and low in
social anxiety estimate the probability and emotional costs of unambiguous
positive and negative social events and found that the two groups did not differ in
their predicted emotional costs of these positive events. However, this study did
not emphasize the anticipation of these events or ensure that participants felt that
they were certain about conveying a desired impression. Moreover, this study did
not investigate other aspects of an emotional reaction as Gilboa-Schectman et al.
(2000) had. Still, the participants in the Gilboa-Schectman et al. study had
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unusually high levels of social anxiety, thus the findings may be attributable to
the most severe levels social anxiety.
Overall, it is still relatively unclear if SAIs actually do exhibit probability and
cost biases when anticipating conveying a desired, positive impression.
Moreover, minimal research has assessed SAIs anticipatory appraisals of others
perceptions. Therefore, we argue that previous research has failed to develop a
more comprehensive model of SAIs judgmental biases. Given that, to our
knowledge, Gilboa-Schectman et al. (2000) is only the study to find a positive
judgmental bias among SIAs, we created a questionnaire modeled after GilboaSchectman et al’s study to gain a more comprehensive understanding of SAIs
social anticipatory appraisals of self and other—including both types of valence.

Social Impact Bias Scale
Because previous research indicates that SAIs interpret positive scenarios
more negatively and less positively than NACs (see Hirsch & Clark, 2004 for a
review), it is important to make the social scenarios as unambiguous as possible.
Thus, similar to Gilboa-Schectman et al. (2000), we did not want participants’
interpretations of the scenarios confounding their appraisals. That is, specifically
in regards to assessing SAIs appraisals of conveying a desired impression, it is
possible that participants may interpret a given social scenario negatively and we
may thusly fail in measuring SAIs anticipatory appraisals of conveying a positive
impression. Thus, in constructing the SIBS, care was taken to ensure that
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participants were imagining and anticipating the probability and costs of social
events in which they were certain of conveying a desired impression.
I argue that although Gilboa-Schectman et al. (2000) attempted to remove
ambiguity from social scenarios, participants’ responses may still have been
confounded by their interpretations of the scenario when deciding whether or not
a desirable impression will be conveyed. For example, when asked to rate the
probability and costs of the social scenario “A co-worker thanks you for your help
during a work crisis” the extent to which a positive impression has been
conveyed is still left up to interpretation. That is, was the person’s response an
exaggerated thanks or a mild praise for something that was expected to have
been done anyway?
Thus, Gilboa-Schectman et al.’s scenarios measuring positive appraisals
(e.g., “A co-worker thanks you for your help during a work crisis.”) as well as
other research with scenarios measuring negative appraisals (e.g., “I will be
ridiculed for voicing my opinion”) imply the conveying of a certain impression;
however, the anticipation of conveying an impression is ambiguous and
susceptible to interpretation unless a reaction from the other person(s) in the
scenario is made explicit. This is because theoretical formulations of social
anxiety assert that when in anticipation of conveying a certain impression, SAIs
are primarily concerned with how other people will respond, even adopting an
observer perspective to imagine how they will appear in the eyes of others (e.g.,
Gilbert, 2001; Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Tower & Gilbert, 1989; Trower, Gilbert &
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Sherling, 1990; Clark & Wells, 1995). Thus, it is the responses from other people
that determines whether one has conveyed a desired or undesired impression.
Moreover, although actual social situations typically entail ambiguous reactions
from others (e.g., a nod of the head), I argue that anticipated social situations
and their imagined desired and undesired impressions/outcomes are
unambiguous in the SAIs mind (e.g., they anticipate eliciting a response of “that
sounds stupid” or “that is impressive”).

Measurement Model of the Social Impact Bias Scale
The proposed measurement model of the SIBS is one consisting of
separate, distinct, latent factors for social impact biases of self-positive, otherpositive, self-negative, and other-negative. Indicators of these domains will
include magnitude, duration, bodily sensations, and self-esteem, with probability
estimates constituting a separate factor for each of these four subscales.
Additionally, given that self-esteem may function as a gauge of one’s sense of
social belonging (i.e., sociometer hypothesis; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs,
1995), it is possible that social impact and probability estimates of anticipated
social impressions may cause self-esteem. That is, self-esteem may not be an
indicator of overall social appraisals, but may be a consequence of one’s social
appraisals. Thus, we anticipate that if model fit is poor, including self-esteem as a
distinct, latent factor may be necessary to improve model fit indices. After the
measurement model of the SIBS has been established, the second purpose of
the study is to test a structural model of the SIBS.
15

An Evolutionary Model of Social Anxiety
and Fears of Evaluation
An evolutionary account of social anxiety provides a theoretical basis for
the existence of both positive and negative, self- and other- judgmental biases.
The bivalent fear of evaluation theory of social anxiety (Weeks & Howell, 2012)
posits that socially anxious individuals fear evaluation in general. Included in this
model are both fears of negative (FNE) and positive evaluation (FPE). Fear of
negative evaluation is the fear of being evaluated negatively (Watson & Friend,
1969), while fear of positive evaluation is proposed to be associated with distress
over anticipated and received positive evaluation from others (Weeks, Jakatdar,
& Heimberg, 2010). Although fear of positive and fear of negative evaluation
moderately correlate together (Weeks & Howell, 2012), fear of positive evaluation
may be related and yet also distinct from fear of negative evaluation. First, it has
been proposed that fear of positive evaluation may be a form of delayed fear of
negative evaluation in that positive evaluation raises SAIs perceived expectations
that others hold, making it less likely that they will meet these heightened
expectations, thus ultimately resulting in negative evaluation (Weeks Jakatdar, &
Heimberg, 2010). Consistent with this account is the finding that, in response to a
positive social interaction, SAIs experience negative reactions and believe that
others hold higher social standards for their future behavior (Wallace & Alden,
1995; Wallace & Alden, 1997).
Second, however, Weeks, Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Norton, and Jakatdar
(2009) suggest that positive and fear of negative evaluation can be seen from
16

Gilberts’ (2001) evolutionary perspective of social anxiety. Gilbert’s (2001)
evolutionary model of social anxiety posits that SAIs contextualize themselves as
existing in a social hierarchy wherein SAIs perceive themselves as relatively
inferior and as vulnerable to losing their status in this hierarchy. People inevitably
compete for the social resources of approval, support and help. Because SAIs
perceive themselves as being inferior in the social hierarchy, however, they
revert to certain behavioral mechanisms such as social comparison,
submissiveness (e.g., eye-gaze avoidance) and self-monitoring (e.g., selffocused attention), due to their fear of losing social status as well as the fear of
gaining social status, which would put themselves in a position to compete with
dominant others for social resources.
For example, one may fear being viewed as boring (i.e., losing social
status) because of the risk of being ostracized by others, and also fear being
viewed as funny (i.e., gaining social status) because of the risk of others social
reprisal or a perceived inability to defend the heightened social status against
seemingly dominant others. Therefore, social anxiety arises when individuals
attempt to acquire or defend social resources (e.g., attempting to attract a
romantic partner or maintain one’s friends when more dominant others are
present, respectively) and that such behavioral and psychological mechanisms
as social comparison, submissiveness, and self-monitoring are used as a means
to regulate arousal (i.e., anxiety) and avoid threat.
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Thus, Weeks, Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Norton, and Jakatdar (2009)
suggest that both fears of evaluation can be seen from the evolutionary model of
social anxiety in that SAIs are motivated to avoid negative evaluation (i.e., fear
negative evaluation) for fear of decline in the social hierarchy and resulting
ostracism, and also to avoid positive evaluation (i.e., fear positive evaluation) for
fear of advancement in the social hierarchy, leading to possible social reprisal
due to superseding superior others (Gilbert, 2001). Consistent with the idea that
fear of positive evaluation is associated with distress and avoidance of upward
shift in social status, fear of positive evaluation has been negatively associated
with pride in response to positive feedback. Conversely, consistent with the idea
that fear of negative evaluation is associated with avoidance of a downward shift
in social status, fear of negative evaluation has been positively associated with
pride in response to positive feedback (Reichenberger, Wiggert, Wilhelm, Weeks
& Blechert, 2015).
Moreover, fear of positive and negative evaluation both predict
submissive behaviors and tendencies to compare oneself unfavorably to others,
indicating large and small effects, respectively (Weeks, Jakatdar, & Heimberg,
2010). In addition, SAIs concerns of social reprisal due to positive impressions
mediated the relationship between fear of positive evaluation and socially
anxious individuals tendency to discount positive social outcome, suggesting that
socially anxious individuals may discount positive feedback as a means of
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reducing anxiety via maintaining an inferior position in the social hierarchy
(Gilbert, 2001; Weeks & Howell, 2012).
Additional research indicates that fear of positive evaluation relates
positively to discomfort in response to positive social feedback, whereas fear of
negative evaluation is not related to discomfort in response to positive social
feedback (Weeks, Heimberg, Rodebaugh, & Norton, 2008). However, fear of
negative evaluation has been associated with increased social evaluative
concerns, pursuit of approval and avoidance of disapproval (Watson & Friend,
1969). Moreover, fear of positive evaluation has been shown to account for
variance in social interaction anxiety above and beyond that of fear of negative
evaluation, suggesting fear of positive evaluation is a distinct construct (Weeks,
Heimberg, Rodebaugh & Norton, 2008).
Confirmatory factor analyses have also indicated that a two factor
structure of fear of negative and fear of positive evaluation is superior to a single
factor structure indicating that fear of negative and fear of positive evaluation
represent related, but distinct constructs (Weeks, Heimberg & Rodebaugh, 2008;
Weeks, Jakatdar & Heimberg, 2010). This model was cross-validated in another
independent sample confirming that fear of positive evaluation, fear of negative
evaluation and also depressive cognitions represent distinct latent factors
(Weeks, Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Norton & Jakatdar, 2009). Importantly, these
factors then loaded onto a higher order factor of social anxiety-related
submissive cognitions. This factor correlated more strongly to measures of social
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anxiety and social submissiveness than did measures of general anxiety and
worry. Moreover, fear of negative evaluation and fear of positive evaluation were
more strongly related to social anxiety than to general anxiety.
These findings provide support for the evolutionary account of social
anxiety as existing in a social hierarchy and that fear of positive evaluation, fear
of negative evaluation and, in certain social contexts, depression can serve the
purpose of maintaining social harmony and signal submissiveness to other, more
dominant others (Weeks, Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Norton & Jakatdar, 2009;
Gilbert, 2001). However, given that fear of positive evaluation is still a relatively
new construct, further distinguishing fear of positive evaluation as distinct
construct from fear of negative evaluation is critical. Since these constructs are at
the core of social anxiety, the second purpose of the current study is to explore
the differential relationship between probability and cost estimates of positive and
negative, self- and other-social appraisals and both loci of fear of evaluation.

Temporality of Fears of Evaluation
and Judgmental Biases
Although several cognitive theories of social anxiety propose that
anticipatory judgmental biases play a causal or maintaining role in social anxiety
symptomology (e.g.,Foa & Kozak, 1985, 1986; Clark & Wells, 1995), the
temporality of judgmental biases and social anxiety is still relatively uncertain.
That is, do judgmental biases of probability and cost cause social anxiety,
including fears of positive and negative evaluation, or does social anxiety cause
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judgmental biases, or is this relationship reciprocal? The research currently
available to answer this question stems from cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT)
treatment studies. It has long been argued that CBT may exert its influence on
anxiety reduction through decreases in inflated probability and cost estimates
(Foa & Kozak, 1986).
Although a variety of studies (for a review, see Smits, Julian, Rosenfield &
Powers, 2012) have evaluated judgmental biases as a mediator in the CBT and
social anxiety reduction relationship and have established that judgmental biases
are correlated with change in social anxiety symptoms, only a couple have
examined the temporal relationship between judgmental biases and social
anxiety symptoms. For instance, past research has revealed that probability and
cost biases each account for unique variance in participants’ reduced levels of
self-reported fear (Smits, Rosenfield, McDonald & Telch, 2006).
Additionally, through repeated measurement of fear and judgmental
biases throughout treatment, this same study was able to establish temporal
precedence. Specifically, this study found that reduced probability biases
predicted self-reported fear, but that this reduced fear then predicted subsequent
reductions in probability biases, indicating a reciprocal relationship. Reduced cost
biases were not predictive of reduced fear, instead, reduced fear predicted
reduced cost biases, suggesting fear precedes biased estimates of cost.
However, this study measured participants levels of self-reported fear on a
single-item scale and did not use an established measure of social anxiety as a
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primary outcome, thus these conclusions of temporality are limited. Nonetheless,
subsequent research (i.e., Calamaras, Tully, Tone, Price & Anderson, 2015)
using fear of negative evaluation as the primary outcome has found similar
results, with probability bias predicting subsequent reduction in fear of negative
evaluation. In this study, fear of negative evaluation did not predict subsequent
changes in probability bias, suggesting a non-reciprocal relationship. Cost bias
was not a significant predictor of change in this study.
Finally, only one study has evaluated self versus other probability and cost
estimates in treatment. Results indicated that participants’ probability and cost
estimates of others (other-related) reactions were more strongly associated with
social anxiety reduction compared to participants probability and cost estimates
at the level of the self (self-related) (Taylor & Alden, 2008). This offers additional
evidence that further delineating self versus others judgmental biases may have
important treatment implications. However, this study did not control for otherrelated judgmental biases, so the extent to which other-judgmental biases
contributed to unique social anxiety symptom reduction above and beyond selfjudgmental biases is unclear. Additionally it is still uncertain whether other-related
judgmental biases and self-related judgmental biases constitute distinct
constructs. In sum, because of the paucity of the research in this area and
because, to our knowledge, no study has manipulated SAIs appraisals of future
social outcomes, the causal relationship between social anxiety and judgmental
biases is relatively uncertain. Therefore, a more comprehensive model of
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judgmental biases and social anxiety is needed, both for treatment and
theoretical purposes.

Hypotheses: Evolutionary Basis of Social Anxiety
and Social Appraisals
According to the evolutionary theory of social anxiety, fear of negative
evaluation and positive evaluation are adaptive cognitive mechanisms whereby
individuals fear and thus avoid decline (i.e., loss of social status) or incline (i.e.,
increase in social status) in the social hierarchy, respectively (Gilbert, 2001). The
present study seeks to answer the question, how do fears of negative and fears
of positive evaluation arise and lead to social anxiety? Fear arises and
influences behavior, in part, because of anticipated, and perhaps exaggerated,
threat of future outcomes—it is the anticipatory estimates of future consequences
that typically have repercussions for what we pursue and what we avoid (e.g.,
“Negative evaluation will be devastating, I must avoid it at all costs,” see,
Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). Thusly, it is proposed in the current
study that fear of positive and negative evaluation stem from exaggerated
estimates of the impact of anticipated social impressions.
Specifically, exaggerated appraisals regarding the impact of a negative
social impression (e.g., “I will look stupid and no one will want to be my friend”)
may cause a fear of negative evaluation and subsequent social anxiety. That is,
a fear of decline in the social hierarchy may exist insofar as one believes that a
negative social impression will result in dramatically negative consequences—
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this appraisal may be the fundamental basis through which fears of evaluation
come to fruition and induce social anxiety. Indeed, if one does not anticipate
inflated negative repercussions of a social impression there would likely be
nothing to fear. Thus, it is proposed that exaggerated anticipatory social
appraisals (self-related and other-related) of conveying a negative, undesirable
impression will positively predict fear of negative evaluation (Hypothesis 1a).
It is expected that overestimates of the impact of positive social
impressions may also result in fear of negative evaluation. Fear of negative
evaluation has been associated with a fear of social reprisal due to positive social
impressions (Weeks & Howell, 2012). Because socially anxious individuals
perceive themselves to exist low in social rank in the social hierarchy, a socially
anxious individual may exaggerate the expected consequences of conveying a
positive impression because this may enable them to avoid further decline in the
social hierarchy (e.g., “I will look smart and gain valuable support from friends;”
avoid ostracism and further loss of already perceived deficient social resources).
However, the greater the social impact that an individual anticipates a positive
social impression to have, the greater the extent of the upshift in the social
hierarchy. This inflated upshift has the repercussion, however, of greater social
competition, and, crucially, socially anxious individuals may perceive themselves
as incapable of defending social gains (Gilbert, 2001), this may induce greater
fear of negative evaluation.
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As positive impressions may lead to perceived upshifts in the social
hierarchy, an exaggerated expectation about the impact of positive social
impressions may lead to exaggerated anticipated shifts in the social hierarchy,
and thusly increased fears of negative evaluation. Therefore, it is proposed that
another mechanism that fear of negative evaluation may stem from is through
exaggerated estimates of the impact of positive social impressions—that is, an
underlying overestimated upward shift in the social hierarchy (e.g. “If I speak
articulately, I will look very smart and it will increase my sense of social status,
but I cannot compete and I will thus be viewed unfavorably”). Therefore, it is
expected that anticipatory appraisals (self-related and other-related) of conveying
a positive, desirable impression will also positively predict fear of negative
evaluation (Hypothesis 1b). It is unclear if participants’ appraisals of positive,
desirable impressions will be predictive of fear of positive evaluation. Because
fear of positive evaluation has been associated with distress in reaction to
positive feedback as well as tendencies to discount positive feedback (Weeks &
Howell, 2012), no a priori hypotheses are stated for this relationship. It is,
however, proposed that negative appraisals will be predictive of fear of positive
evaluation.
Previous research has indicated that SAIs may fear positive evaluation
due to subsequent negative social impressions. Socially anxious individuals may
anticipate social impressions to bring heightened, and thereby unreachable,
expectations, and thus anticipate resulting negative social impressions.(e.g.,
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Wallace & Alden, 1997). According to evolutionary theory, this may have had the
benefit of impelling individuals to avoid anticipated upshifts in the social hierarchy
by overestimating the perceived danger of the competitive consequences of such
upshifts. It is thusly posited that fear of positive evaluation may exist insofar as
participants overestimate the impact of negative social impressions. Therefore it
is expected that anticipated social appraisals (self-related and other-related) of
conveying a negative social impression will positively predict fear of positive
evaluation (hypothesis 1c).
The current study implemented a structural equation model (SEM)
approach to assess the association between judgmental biases and social
anxiety constructs (i.e., trait social anxiety, fear of positive and fear of negative
evaluation). Two competing SEM models were tested (hypothesis 2). That is, one
in which social appraisals act as a predictor of social anxiety, with fears of
evaluation as a mediator. This model is presented in Figure 2. Conversely, one in
which fears of evaluation act as a predictor of social anxiety, with social
appraisals as a mediator. This model is presented in Figure 1.
In addition, I argue that in order to have a comprehensive model of social
appraisals, individuals’ estimates of the impact of social impressions on others
(other-related social appraisals) need to be included. Thus, other-related
appraisals were examined as a distinct construct and predictor, or outcome, of
fears of evaluation compared to self-related social appraisals (hypothesis 3).
Finally, although previous research (i.e., Trew & Alden, 2009) has shown that
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social anxiety and depression do not interact in their prediction of negative social
appraisals, it is unclear how depression may affect positive social appraisals.
Thus, depression will be statistically controlled for in the present study.

27

CHAPTER TWO
METHOD

Participants
Participants were students from California State University San
Bernardino social science classes, who participated to receive extra credit.
Seven participants were deleted for indicating that they did not respond to the
questionnaires honestly, 39 participants were deleted for a completion time of
less than 15 minutes, 65 were deleted for failing the random response check
items, five participants were deleted for response times over 500 minutes. The
Mahalanobis distance test was used to determine multivariate outliers.
Mahalanobis distance determines an outlier by assessing the distance of a given
score from the center of the data (Mahalanobis, 1936). A larger distance
suggests that the case is an outlier. Mahalanobis distance follows a chi-square
distribution and thus multivariate cases can be identified by their magnitude and
significance. Multivariate values that fell below 0.1% were removed. Thus, 33
multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis d-squared > 34, p < .001) were identified and
deleted.
The final sample consisted of 474 participants (male = 307; female = 167)
with ages ranging from 17 to 65 (M = 22.39; SD = 5.52). The ethnic composition
of the sample was 6.5% Asian American, 0.4% American Indian, 5.3% African
American, 65.4% Hispanic/Latino, 1.5% Pacific Islander, 16% White, and 4.9%
Other. Sixty-four percent of students reported that their yearly income ranged
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from $0 to $15,000, 18% reported a yearly income between $15,000 and
$30,000, with the remaining participants reporting incomes of $30,000 or greater.
For their parent or caretakers highest level of education completed, 24% of
participants reported some college, 22% reported a high school diploma, 17% a
college degree, 12% some high school, 10% reported grade school and 7%
reported a post-graduate degree.
To rule out confounding results stemming from gender differences, we
also examined the social anxiety related variables separately for males and
females. Females (M = 19.60; SD = 7.75) and males (M = 20.80, SD = 8.32)
scored equally on measures of fear negative evaluation, t(472) = 1.53, p = .128,
these levels of FNE are similar to established norms in a sample of multiracial
students and slightly above community samples (Rodebaugh et al., 2011).
Moreover, genders scored equally on measures of fear of positive evaluation,
with female (M = 26.54, SD = 14.15) and male (M = 27.52, SD = 15.17) mean
differences being nonsignificant, t(472) = .688, p = .492. Genders also scored
equally on measures of social interaction anxiety with female (M = 19.55, SD =
13.73) and male (M = 19.65, SD = 13.92) participants mean differences, t(472) =
.071, p = .944, being nonsignificant as well. Therefore, male and female
participants were analyzed simultaneously. Mean social anxiety in this present
sample is slightly above community sample norms and similar to student sample
norms (Rodebaugh et al., 2011). .
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Procedure
Surveys were distributed through the use of Qualtrics, an online survey
editorial system. Participants accessed the study through SONA, an online
department research management system, and completed the surveys from
personal or lab computers at their convenience. No names or other identifying
information were recorded. Each participant received the SIBS first, this was
done to reduce the carry over effects from the other social anxiety related
measures in the survey flow (i.e., FPE, FNE, and SIAS). Participants received
the subsequent surveys in a random order, with the exception of the
demographic information form, which participants always received last.

Measures
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale
The Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond &
Lovibond, 1995) was used to control for depression, anxiety and stress. The
DASS-21 was chosen for it is ability to measure several divergent constructs in a
succinct manner—each subscale of depression, anxiety and stress contains
seven items. Participants report symptoms experienced over the course of the
previous week on a 0 (Did not apply to me at all) to 3 (Applied to me very much,
or most of the time) Likert scale. The DASS-21 has Cronbach’s alpha coefficients
ranging from .87 to .94, has been shown to correlate strongly with other
established measures of depression and anxiety and has exhibited an excellent
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factor structure in clinical samples (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson,
1998).
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale—Straightforward Score
The 20-item Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) measures fears of
general social interaction and discriminates between social anxiety and other
anxiety disorders (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). Participants are asked to respond on
a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 0 (not at all characteristic or true of me)
to 4 (extremely characteristic or true of me). The SIAS-S has been found to have
excellent internal consistency in undergraduate samples with a Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient of .93 (Rodebaugh, Woods & Heimberg, 2007). The reverse-scored
items have been shown to compromise the factor structure of the SIAS and show
weaker relationships to convergent measures compared to the straightforwardly
worded items. Thus removing the reverse-scored items has been shown to
improve the construct and factorial validity of the scale (Rodebaugh, Woods &
Heimberg, 2007). Moreover, previous research indicates that the SIAS reversescored items may be moderated by higher age and lower education and thus
comprise the validity of the scale (Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Brown, Fernandez,
Blanco, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2011). Therefore, only the 17 straightforward
items of the SIAS (SIAS-S) will be used to calculate total scores.
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale—Straightforward Score
The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Leary, 1983) is a truncated
version of the original 30-item FNE (Watson & Friend, 1969). The BFNE consists
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of 12-items measuring a core component of social anxiety, fear of negative
evaluation. Using a five-point Likert scale (0 [not at all characteristic of me] to 4
[extremely characteristic of me]). Similar to the SIAS, however, the BFNE has
revealed a 2-factor structure with the reverse-worded and straightforwardly
worded items loading on separate dimensions, and weaker convergent validity
for the reverse-worded items relative to the straightforwardly-worded items
(Weeks et al., 2005; Rodebaugh, Woods, Thissen, Heimberg, Chabless, &
Rapee, 2004; Carleton, McCeary, Norton & Asmundson, 2006). Thus, the
straightforwardly worded items and the reverse-worded items were given but only
the eight straightforwardly worded items (BFNE-S) were used to calculate total
scores. The BFNE-S has demonstrated excellent internal consistency
(Cronbach’s alphas > .92) in undergraduate samples and clinical samples
(Rodebaugh et al., 2004; Weeks et al., 2005).
Fear of Positive Evaluation Scale
The Fear of Positive Evaluation Scale (FPES; Weeks, Heimberg, &
Rodebaugh, 2008) is a 10-item measure using a 10-point Likert scale (0 [Not at
all true] to 9 [Very True]) that measures apprehension and distress associated
with positive evaluation and demonstrated strong internal consistency in an
undergraduate sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .80), good test-retest reliability, have
been found to comprise a single latent factor and has demonstrated support for
discriminant and convergent validity (Weeks, Heimberg & Rodebaugh, 2008).
Participants are asked to respond to the statements as though they are relevant

32

to people they do not know very well to control familiarity biases. Sample items
include “I feel uneasy when I receive praise from authority figures” and “I
generally feel uncomfortable when people give me compliments.” The FPE scale
contains two reverse coded items that are not used in the calculation of total
scale scores. The FPES has been shown to be related, but distinct to FNE.
Social Impact Bias Scale
The Social Impact Bias Scale (SIBS; Johns & Lewin, unpublished) is a
novel measure created for the purposes of measuring socially anxious
individuals' probability and cost estimates of anticipated unambiguous positive
and negative social events. To make the anticipation of conveying a desired or
undesired impression salient, each social scenario entailed a response ending
with an adjective from the other person(s) in the scenario, thus eliminating
ambiguity (e.g., “As you are talking to a person you have just met, an interesting
personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. The person smiles and
responds with “Wow, you seem really interesting”). After reading the scenario,
participants were asked to rate the extent to which they, themselves, would feel
this way if this were to happen, using the same adjective that came from the
person(s) in the scenario (i.e., “If this were to happen, rate the degree to which
you would feel that you are interesting”). Consistent with Gilboa-Schectman et
al., we also emphasized that participants imagine and anticipate such a scenario,
even if they thought it was unlikely or felt uncertain about it.
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The same design was used to assess participants’ probability and costs of
others perceptions, except, after reading the scenario, participants were asked to
rate the degree to which other person(s) in the scenario perceived the participant
on that adjective (i.e., “If this were to happen, rate the degree to which this
person would feel that you are _____, e.g., interesting”). Conversely, negative
social scenarios were constructed in a manner that was identical to the positive
scenarios, but was different in the outcome in that individuals did not receive the
desired response from the other person(s) in the scenario. The negative
scenarios also did not end in a negative adjective as it was determined that this
would make the scenarios unrealistic. Thus, the scenarios ended in a more likely
negatively conveyed impression (e.g., “As you are talking to a person you have
just met, an interesting personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it.
The person frowns and responds with “is that supposed to be interesting?”). As
opposed to an outright negative reaction (e.g., the person says “you’re boring”).
However, similar to the positive scenarios, participants did rate their
responses based on the relevant adjective (e.g., “If this were to happen, rate the
extent to which you would feel that you are boring”). These adjectives were
chosen because they represented the opposite of the positive adjectives (e.g.,
interesting vs boring). Like the positive scenarios, participants also responded to
an other-subscale for the negative scenarios. As an attempt to replicate GilboaSchectman et al., the only study to find anticipated positive judgmental biases
among SAIs, we included the same subscales of probability, magnitude,

34

duration, physical reaction, and self-esteem for each scenario as measures of
probability and impact. Thus the SIBS consists of 20 social scenarios (i.e., 5 selfpositive scenarios [SP], 5 other-positive scenarios [OP]; 5 self-negative scenarios
[SN], and 5 other-negative scenarios [ON]) each scenario included subscales of
anticipated probability, magnitude, duration, physical arousal, and self-esteem of
the corresponding scenario to measure respondents estimated social impact.
Each social scenario was matched closely in terms of content and wording. The
SIBS can be found in Appendix C.

Design
The current study employed a non-experimental design. Fears of
negative/positive evaluation were tested as predictors of social anxiety with
appraisals as a mediators. Alternatively, appraisals were tested as predictors of
social anxiety with of fears of negative/positive evaluation as mediators.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS

Analysis Strategy
We used SPSS AMOS to test the hypothesized model presented in Figure
1. To statistically control for depression, we regressed depression on the
measures fear of negative evaluation, fear of positive evaluation, and social
interaction anxiety to obtain unstandardized residuals. The unstandardized
residuals were used in model analysis. The subscales of the SIBS for each
dimension of social impact biases (i.e., self-positive and negative, other-positive
and negative) were parceled by summing each subscale of the SIBS dimension
and using the sum of the dimensions respective subscales as indicators. The use
of parcels has several advantages. Most relevant is the parsimonious use of
subscales as indicators (Little, Cunningham, Shahar & Widaman, 2002). The use
of parceling reduces the overall parameters in the current model dramatically,
resulting in a much more parsimonious model. This is done in particular because
as mentioned the purpose of the current model is the measurement of the
relevant construct (i.e., social appraisals) and not the individual items.
Because the interest of the present study is on the development of the
construct, social appraisals, and not the development of a scale, the relevance of
what each individual item is measuring is not as important as capturing the
construct. That is, the purpose of the current study is not scale construction but
comprehensive measurement of the relevant construct. Moreover, parceling has
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the potential to reduce sampling error, improve the stability of the solution,
resulting in smaller standard errors and more stable estimates of parameters
(Little, Cunningham, Shahar & Widaman, 2002). Cronbach’s alpha was used to
assess the internal consistency of the questionnaires before SEM analysis. For
consistency, participants replied to the self-esteem subscale for both the selfrelated and other-related dimension of the SIBS, but the other-related selfesteem subscale was not used in statistical analyses for lack of theoretical
justification.

Psychometric Properties of the Social Impact Bias Scale
A reliability analysis revealed that removal of the physical arousal
subscale was necessary in order to improve the overall internal consistency of
the latent factors. Table 1 shows the final model’s internal consistency for each of
the SIBS dimensions. As indicated in Table 1, after removal of the physical
arousal subscale, each of the SIBS dimensions demonstrated excellent internal
consistency (all Cronbach’s alphas > .90). However, for the purposes of testing
probability as a distinct measured variable, the physical arousal subscale was
retained in initial model analysis, because although it resulted in reduced internal
consistency (SN = .84 versus .90; ON = .70 versus .81; SP = .78 versus .80; OP
= .62 versus .70), this reduction was minimal and this subscale’s presence was
necessary as the deletion of this subscale would leave the other-appraisal
domains with two indicators and a minimum of three indicators are needed for
each latent factor. It is important to note that because of the present study’s use
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of parceling, latent variable alphas could be based on the summation of
subscales (i.e., adding the sum of responses on magnitude, probability, and
duration) or on the summation of individual items (i.e., the sum of item-level
responses to each of the social scenarios on each of the subscales). Latent
variable alphas reported in Table 1 are based on item-level responses. The use
of scale-level alphas are nearly identical.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables.
Variable
1. SIAS-S
2. BFNE-S
3. FPE
4. Self-Negative
5. Other-Negative
6. Self-Positive
7. Other-Positive

Mean (SD)
19.61 (13.84)
20.37 (8.14)
27.18 (14.81)
74.35 (40.03)
61.65 (25.18)
114.34 (26.35)
76.39 (21.20)

Scale alpha
1
1.00
.52**
.38**
.30**
.22**
.08
.06

.94
.93
.83
.93
.94
.95
.94

2
1.00
.10**
.35*
.29**
.11*
.03

Correlations
3
4
5

1.00
.29**
.21**
.07**
.05*

6

1.00
.68** 1.00
.21** .31** 1.00
.16** .34** .79**

Note: * p < .05, **p < .001. Correlations shown in table are after statistically
controlling for depression.

Table 2 delineates the reliability of the subscales for each dimension of
the SIBS. A reliability analysis revealed that the subscales of the self-positive
dimension demonstrated good internal consistency (each Cronbach’s alpha >
.80). The self-esteem subscale of the self-negative dimension demonstrated
good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .85). The remaining subscales on
the self-negative dimension revealed adequate to good internal consistency
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(Cronbach’s alphas > .77). Reliability analyses for the other-negative domain
revealed good internal consistency for each subscale (Cronbach’s alphas > .83),
similar findings arose with the other-positive domain with each subscale
indicating good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas > . 86). No removal of
SIBS questionnaire items would improve internal consistency. The SIAS, BFNE,
and FPE each demonstrated good to excellent internal consistency.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Subscales of the Social Impact Bias Scale.
Scale

No. of
items

M (SD)

Alpha

Other-Negative
Magnitude
Probability
Duration

5
5
5

17.59 (7.10)
17.54 (7.30)
12.40 (7.82)

.83
.85
.86

Other-Positive
Magnitude
Probability
Duration

5
5
5

17.43 (4.20)
23.23 (5.70)
12.44 (6.00)

.89
.88
.86

Self-Negative
Magnitude
Probability
Duration
Self-esteem

5
5
5
5

15.30 (8.67)
15.46 (8.80)
11.80 (8.20)
17.20 (8.72)

.78
.79
.77
.85

Self-Positive
Magnitude
Probability
Duration
Self-esteem

5
5
5
5

30.20 (6.82)
30.33 (7.00)
21.26 (9.77)
32.55 (7.13)

.90
.90
.92
.84
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Structural Model
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was implemented using SPSS
AMOS. Based upon the current study’s medium to large sample size and the
acceptable assumptions of normality and independence, Maximum Likelihood
(ML) was used for model estimation (Hu, Bentler, & Kano, 1992). Model fit was
assessed utilizing the Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1988) with values of
.95 or higher suggesting good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999); the Standardized Root
Mean Square Residual (SRMR; Hu & Bentler, 1999), values of .08 or less being
indicative of a good fitting model; the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA; Browne & Cudeck, 1993), values of RMSEA that are .06 or less
suggest a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), whereas values .10 or higher suggest a
model that fits the data poorly (Browne & Cudeck, 1993).
The initial model consisted of latent factors of self-positive (indicators of
magnitude, duration, self-esteem, and physical arousal), other-positive
(indicators of magnitude, duration, physical arousal), self-negative (indicators of
magnitude, duration, self-esteem and physical arousal) and other-negative
(indicators of magnitude, duration, and physical arousal). The probability
subscale was implemented as a distinct, measured variable. This model is
presented in Figure 1. This initial model indicated a poor fit, χ2(168, N = 474) =
6103.22, RMSEA = .256 [.249, .264]; CFI =.38; GFI = .56, SRMR = .26.
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Figure 1. The Hypothesized Model.
Note: For indicators, M = Magnitude, D = Duration, SE = Self-esteem, Ph = Physical
arousal. For factors, SP = Self-positive, OP = Other-positive, SN = Self-negative, ON = Othernegative, SP-P = Self-positive probability, OP-P = Other-positive probability, SN-P = Selfnegative probability, ON-P = Other-negative probability.

Evaluation of modification indices suggested that probability was not a
distinct latent factor. Thus, consistent with literature indicating that probability and
magnitude are highly correlated (e.g., Foe et al., 1996), and therefore not distinct,
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probability was used as an indicator of the latent factors. Because previous
reliability analyses revealed that removal of the physical arousal subscale would
improve the internal consistency of the SIBS domains, we replaced the physical
arousal subscale with the probability subscale as an indicator of SIBS social
appraisal domains. Further modification indices revealed that correlated
measurement error was necessary to improve model fit. This correlated
measurement error is expected since the subscales of each reaction entail a
shared method component (Brown 2015). Specifically, each subscale of every
social scenario assesses the same construct (i.e., anticipatory social appraisals),
with similar wording, using the same or similar social scenarios under the same
method (i.e., questionnaire); thus the presence correlated measurement error is
theoretically justified. Since the specific subscales of each scenario and
dimension of the SIBS were presented in randomized order, neither correlations
are assumed to be causal in nature (Brown, 2015).
The final model consisted of four distinct latent factors of self-positive
(indicators of magnitude, probability, duration and self-esteem), other-positive
(indicators of magnitude, probability, duration), self-negative (indicators of
magnitude, probability, duration and self-esteem), and other-negative (indicators
of magnitude, probability, and duration). The final model yielded a good fit (Hu &
Bentler, 1999), χ2(94, N = 474) = 173.80, RMSEA = .042 [.032, .052]; CFI =.99;
GFI = .96; SRMR = .04. Moreover, the 90% CIs of the RMSEA included values
less than .06. This final model is presented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. The Final Model.
Note: *p < .05, **p < .001. For indicators, M = Magnitude, D = Duration, SE = Self-esteem, P =
Probability. For factors, SP = Self-positive, OP = Other-positive, SN = Self-negative, ON = Othernegative. Standardized coefficients are displayed.

As Table 3 shows, factor loadings revealed that all indicators loaded
strongly on their respective latent factors. Standardized factor loadings ranged
from .60 to .98 and were all significant at the p = .001 level. To further examine
the importance of each indicator, we examined the amount of variance that each
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latent factor accounted for in their respective indicators. The self-negative latent
factor accounted for the most amount of variance in the probability indicator
subscale (97%), followed by the magnitude subscale (95%), the duration
subscale (70%), and the self-esteem subscale (58%). The other-negative latent
factor accounted for the most amount of variance in the probability subscale
(96%), followed by the magnitude subscale (95%), and the duration subscale
(50%). The self-positive latent factor accounted for the most amount of variance
in the magnitude subscale (96%), followed by the probability subscale (95%), the
self-esteem subscale (58%) and the duration subscale (36%). The other-positive
latent factor accounted for the most amount of variance in the probability
subscale (95%), followed by the magnitude subscale (93%), and the duration
subscale (38%). These findings suggest that across all latent factors, the
magnitude and probability indicators may represent the “core” (see, Little,
Cunningham, Shahar & Widaman, 2002) of social appraisals with duration and
self-esteem playing an important but less critical role in anticipatory social
appraisals.
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Table 3. Factor Loadings of the Social Impact Bias Scale.
Factor
Standardized loading
Self-negative
Magnitude
.98
Duration
.84
Probability
.98
Self-esteem
.76
Other-negative
Magnitude
.97
Duration
.84
Probability
.98
Self-positive
Magnitude
.98
Duration
.60
Probability
.97
Self-esteem
.76
Other-positive
Magnitude
.97
Duration
.62
Probability
.97
Note: All factors loadings p < .001.

Testing of Hypotheses
To test the present study’s specific hypotheses, we examined the
association between the latent factors of the SIBS and fears of evaluation. Bias
corrected (BCa) bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 10000 samples
were used to determine the significance of coefficients. Consistent with the
expectations of hypothesis 1a, self-negative anticipatory appraisals were
positively associated with fear of negative evaluation (standardized coefficient =
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.25, p < .001); other-negative anticipatory appraisals were positively associated
with fear of negative evaluation as well (standardized coefficient = .14, p = .036).
Consistent with expectations of hypothesis 1c, self-negative appraisals were
positively associated with fear of positive evaluation (standardized coefficient =
.28, p < .001). However, inconsistent with expectations of hypothesis 1c, othernegative appraisals were associated with fear of positive evaluation
(standardized coefficient = .03, p = .641). This suggests that other-negative
appraisals may have the potential to differentiate fears of negative from fears of
positive evaluation.
Consistent with expectations of hypothesis 1b, self-positive anticipatory
appraisals were associated with fear of negative evaluation (standardized
coefficient = .17, p = .023), representing a small to moderate effect. However,
unexpectedly, other-positive anticipatory appraisals were negatively associated
with fear of negative evaluation (standardized coefficient = -.19, p = .012).
Consistent with expectations, inclusion of self-positive (standardized coefficient =
.06, p = .448) and other-positive (standardized coefficient = -.12, p = .108) paths
to fear of positive evaluation did not improve model fit χ2(92, N = 474) = 170.97,
RMSEA = .043 [.033, .052]; CFI = .99; GFI = .96; SRMR = .03 and standardized
coefficients for these paths were small and insignificant, suggesting that positive
anticipatory social appraisals may distinguish fear of negative from fear of
positive evaluation. However, hypothesis 2 in which this model is compared to an
alternative, competing model wherein anticipatory social appraisals are tested as
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a mediator in the fears of evaluation—social anxiety relationship could not be
tested utilizing the present study’s methodology. The relative strength of model fit
indices of statistically equivalent models cannot be used to determine the validity
of the models. This is because it is possible for model fit indices of an incorrect
model that are statistically equivalent to have a model fit indices (Keith, 2014).
To test hypothesis 3 and examine the construct validity of the SIBS, we
tested the distinctness of the other-appraisals from the self-appraisals by loading
other-appraisal indicators for the other-negative and other-positive latent factors
onto their respective self-negative and self-positive latent factors (i.e., a twofactor model of the SIBS). Poor model fit of this two-factor model of the SIBS,
relative to the four-factor model in which both self- and other- appraisals are
distinct, would support the notion that both self- and other-appraisals are distinct
and thus necessary to measure. Results supported the latter, the two-factor
model yielded a poor model fit, χ2(104, N = 474) = 2094.30, RMSEA = .201 [.194,
.209]; CFI =.77; GFI = .70, SRMR = .09. That is, in support of hypothesis 3, the
four-factor model in which self- and other-appraisals were modeled as distinct
factors revealed a far superior fit to the data relative to the two-factor model,
suggesting that both self- and other-appraisals are distinct. Table 4 summarizes
the comparison of fit indices of the models used in the current study.
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Table 4. Comparison of Fit Indices Among Competing Models.
Model
Final
Initial
Two factor
Paths to FPE

χ2
173.80
6103.22
2094.30
170.97

df
94
168
104
92

CFI
.99
.38
.77
.99

RMSEA
.042
.256
.201
.043

SRMR
.04
.26
.09
.03

Indirect Effects
The findings of the indirect effects of anticipatory social appraisals on
social anxiety through fears of evaluation were examined. Indirect effects may
further lend evidence for the construct validity of the SIBS. Results revealed that
with the exception of other-negative anticipatory social appraisals (standardized
indirect effect = .07, p = .074), anticipatory social appraisals may influence social
anxiety indirectly through fears of positive and negative evaluation (standardized
indirect effects for self-negative = .21, p < .001; self-positive = .08, p = .021;
other-positive = -.09, p = .009). All direct paths from SIBS factors to the SIAS
were small and insignificant, all ps > .18, as shown in Figure 2.

Discriminant Validity of the Social Impact Bias Scale
Finally, it is possible that self and other, positive and negative social
appraisals are associated with fears of evaluations due to anxiety, depression, or
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stress. To rule this out, we assessed the discriminate validity of the SIBS; that is,
whether the SIBS dimensions are specific to social anxiety or variables known to
be related to social anxiety and social appraisals (i.e., stress, anxiety, and
depression). High correlation between these variables and the SIBS would
suggest poor discriminant validity. After statistically controlling for depression, the
subscales of the SIBS did not correlate with stress or general anxiety (all rs < .07;
all ps > .16), suggesting that depression is responsible for the subsequently
reported relationships between the SIBS and general anxiety and stress.
However, because depression and anxiety are highly correlated, we
examined the relationship between the SIBS and third variables controlling for
anxiety and stress. After statistically controlling for anxiety, depression was
negatively correlated with self-positive appraisals (r = -.10, p = .024),
uncorrelated with other-positive appraisals (r = -.03, p =.52), positively correlated
with other-negative (r = .14, p =.002) and positively correlated with self-negative
appraisals (r =.213, p < .001). Stress was positively correlated with othernegative (r = .10, p =.03) and self-negative appraisals (r = .13, p = .006), but not
positive appraisals (rs < .03). After statistically controlling for stress, a similar
pattern emerged. Depression was correlated with self- (r = .10, p = .006), and
other- (r = .13, p = < .001) negative appraisals and self-positive appraisals
(r = -.11, p = .016), but not other-positive appraisals. Anxiety was only correlated
with self-negative appraisals (r = .11, p = .018; all other ps > .09). Because
stress and anxiety did not correlate with the SIBS when depression was
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statistically controlled for, but correlated with the other DASS subscales when
only anxiety or stress was controlled for, this pattern of results suggests that the
small correlation between the SIBS and stress and anxiety may be attributed to
depression. These findings lend evidence for the discriminant validity of the SIBS
and further support for the appropriateness of statistically controlling for
depression in the present study
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION

Research examining socially anxious individuals (SAIs) negative, selfrelevant anticipatory social appraisals is abundant (e.g., Foa et al, 1996; GilboaSchechtman, et al., 2000; Bielak & Moscovitch, 2013). It is unambiguously clear
that SAIs overestimate the impact that a negatively conveyed social impression
would bring to their sense of self. But do such unidimensional appraisals fully
capture SAIs social appraisals? In the current study, we utilized SEM to develop
and examine a more comprehensive model of SAIs social appraisals, assessing
other-negative (impact of negative social impressions on others), self-positive
(anticipated impact of positive social impression on oneself), and other-positive
(anticipated impact of positive social impression on others) in addition to selfnegative appraisals. After theoretically justified adjustments, findings generally
supported the hypothesized model. At the latent level, consistent with
expectations and supporting past research, self-negative social appraisals were
positively associated with fear of negative evaluation and fear of positive
evaluation.
Also consistent with expectations and adding to past research, othernegative social appraisals were positively associated with fear of negative
evaluation; inconsistent with expectations, however, other-negative appraisals
were unrelated to fear of positive evaluation. Moreover, these other-negative
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appraisals were not indirectly related to social anxiety through fears of
evaluation. Consistent with expectations and further adding to the social
appraisal (or judgement bias) and social anxiety literature, self-positive social
appraisals were positively associated with fear of negative evaluation,
contributed to increased social anxiety indirectly through fear of negative
evaluation, but were unrelated to fear of positive evaluation. Interestingly,
inconsistent with expectations, other-positive social appraisals were not
associated positively, but negatively with fear of negative evaluation, and led to
social anxiety indirectly through fear of negative evaluation. Thus SAIs may not
only anticipate that they, themselves, will respond negatively to a social mishap,
but that others will respond nearly as negatively. Perhaps paradoxically, SAIs
may also anticipate an increased impact of a conveyed positive social impression
on themselves, but less of this impact on others impressions.

Discussion of Findings
What explains the apparent contradictory finding that increased selfpositive appraisals are predictive of increased fear of negative evaluation, but
that other-positive appraisals are predictive of decreased fear of negative
evaluation? According to the anchoring and adjustment hypothesis (Gilovich,
Medvec & Savitsky, 2000), individuals anchor on their own positive appraisal of
themselves, adjust, and extrapolate from their own experience what others will
experience. In support of the anchoring and adjustment hypothesis, self-positive
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and other-positive appraisals are both positively and highly correlated. From this
view, we would expect that if increased self-positive appraisals predict increased
fear of negative evaluation, then increased other-positive appraisals would also
predict increased fear of negative evaluation. Thus, if SAIs were anchoring and
adjusting according to their own internal state, we would expect decreased fear
of negative evaluation among SAIs; of course, this is not the case. It may well be
that SAIs do not rely on their own experience, but instead their beliefs about
others; in contrast, non-SAIs may rely on their own internal state to infer and
anticipate what others may think.
Therefore, one partial explanation for how fear of negative evaluation may
develop is through decreased reliance on one’s own positive internal states when
in anticipation of conveying a positive impression. Social anxiety may develop
when individuals rely on preexisting beliefs that others are hypercritical or that
others have exaggerated social standards (e.g., Wallace & Alden, 1991;
Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Clark & Wells, 1995), which may lead to decreased
anticipated positive social appraisals from others and thus fear of negative
evaluation. This supports theoretical perspectives that suggests that social
anxiety is a disorder comprised of distorted perceptions of others’ perceptions
(Gilbert, 2001), and that social anxiety is associated with impairments in theory of
mind such that SAIs exaggeratedly read into others’ mental states (Washburn,
Wilson, Roes, Rnic & Harkness, 2016). On the other hand, an increased reliance
on one’s own internal states to infer others positive reactions may lead to
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reductions in fear of negative evaluation and thus decreased social anxiety. This
view is supported by previous research indicating that SAI’s self-worth is
contingent upon others’ perceptions and that reductions in contingent self-worth
is related to reductions in social anxiety (Taylor & Alden, 2008).
Although within valence self-related and other-related anticipatory social
appraisals were highly correlated in the present study, this high correlation is
expected. Socially anxious individuals have been shown to base their sense of
self on their appraisals of others responses (Taylor & Alden, 2008). This
contingent self-worth may result in SAIs basing self-negative and self-positive
estimates of social impact in anticipation of others responses, which may have
led to overlap among the self-related and other-related social appraisals.
Nonetheless, a two-factor model in which self and other dimensions of the SIBS
loaded on a single factor within their respective valence (i.e. positive and
negative), resulted in a much poorer model fit relative to a four-factor model in
which self-related and other-related, positive and negative dimensions of the
SIBS loaded onto distinct factors.
Moreover, whereas self-negative appraisals were positively associated
with both fear of positive and negative evaluation, other-negative appraisals were
only associated with fear of negative evaluation. Whereas, self-positive
appraisals were positively associated with fear of negative evaluation, otherpositive appraisals were negatively associated with fear of negative evaluation
and positive social appraisals were not associated with fear of positive
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evaluation. These findings, although preliminary, suggest that measuring selfpositive, other-positive, and other-negative social appraisals may add
incremental validity in the prediction of fears of evaluation and social anxiety
beyond the assessment of mere self-negative social appraisals.
The present findings support the evolutionary account of social anxiety—
fear of positive and negative evaluation may arise when individuals overestimate
consequences of social impressions (i.e., exaggerated upward and downward
shifts in the social hierarchy). The present study suggests that individuals with
social anxiety may anticipate that a positive impression will bring increased social
status for themselves, but that this upshift in social rank may also put them in the
position to compete with others. However, socially anxious individuals view
themselves as unable to compete and defend social resources, this then results
in fear of negative evaluation and subsequent social anxiety (Gilbert, 2001).
Indeed, previous research has shown that fear of negative evaluation is
associated with concerns of social reprisal from conveying a positive impression
(Weeks & Howell, 2012).
In this sense, socially anxious individuals may fear negative evaluation
because of an overestimation of rise in social status—that a positive impression
would increase their social status to an inflated extent which increases the
socially anxious individuals’ perception that they are in competition with dominant
others and fear of negative evaluation thusly ensues. This is supported by the
present study’s findings that anticipated positive reaction from others is
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negatively associated with fear of negative evaluation. That is, self-positive and
other-positive social appraisals may be associated in the opposite directions with
fear of negative evaluation because the extent to which a positive impression has
an impact on oneself (i.e., the increase in one’s social status; “I will look smart
and feel good about it, but I cannot defend this social image”), the less of a
positive impact it will have on others (e.g., a higher likelihood of competition with
others; “Looking smart may cause others to view me as a threat”), resulting in a
fear of negative evaluation.
However, positive social appraisals were only associated with fear of
negative evaluation in the present study and not fear of positive evaluation, what
explains this differential association? Research suggests that SAIs discount
positive feedback in general, but that fear of positive evaluation may induce
individuals to discount this feedback to avoid social reprisal, whereas fear of
negative evaluation is not associated with disqualification of positive feedback
due to a concern for social reprisal (Weeks & Howell, 2012).
It is possible that in the present study, those with higher fear of positive
evaluation discounted and minimized positive outcomes and this disqualification
of positive feedback led to a lack of association of positive social appraisals with
fear of positive evaluation. This account fits with the evolutionary perspective in
that fear of negative evaluation keeps one from moving too low in the social
hierarchy (thus, discounting anticipatory positive social impressions would be
counterproductive) and fear of positive evaluation is a mechanism in which keeps
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one from moving too high in the social hierarchy (thus, discounting anticipatory
positive social impression would be productive in that one avoids an upshift in the
social hierarchy; Weeks & Howell, 2012; Gilbert, 2001).
Also consistent with the evolutionary account of social anxiety, negative
self-related and other-related anticipatory social appraisals were positively
associated with fear of negative evaluation. An anticipated negatively conveyed
impression may bring a further decline in a socially anxious individual whom
already perceives themselves to be low in social rank, the exaggerated
anticipated extent of this may result in further fears of negative evaluation
(Gilbert, 2001). Accordingly, the present results suggest that socially anxious
individuals may also anticipate others to react nearly as negatively in response to
the undesirably conveyed impression. Interestingly, self-negative anticipatory
social appraisals were predictive of fear of positive evaluation, but other-negative
anticipatory social appraisals were not.
Exaggerated self-negative anticipatory social appraisals may induce a fear
of positive evaluation insofar as socially anxious individuals believe that positive
evaluation may lead to negative, undesirable social impressions, including social
reprisal (Weeks & Howell, 2012), due to the perceived heightened, and thus
unreachable, social expectations that socially anxious individuals think positive
impressions bring (Wallace & Alden, 1997). Indeed, one may not fear positive
evaluation if one does not exaggerate the negative social outcomes that may
result from positive social evaluations. However, the present study suggests that
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other-negative anticipatory social appraisals are not as critical in the
development of fear of positive evaluation. This finding is seemingly at odds with
research indicating that fear of positive evaluation is associated with concerns of
social appraisal, if this is the case, then we would expect that other-negative
appraisals would be predictive of fear of positive evaluation (Weeks & Howell,
2012). However, fear of positive evaluation is a cognitive mechanism associated
with fear of an increase in social status, and negative impressions have no
relevance for increases in social status. Accordingly, the present study found no
association between the impact of negative impression on others and fear of
positive evaluation, supporting an evolutionary account of social anxiety.
It is important to address an alternative interpretation of the results from
the evolutionary perspective. Namely, that in anticipation of conveying a positive
or negative social impression, individuals may either overestimate the increase
(e.g., “I will look very smart and everyone will notice and admire me, and I
therefore cannot adhere to this admiration”) or overestimate the decrease in their
position in the social hierarchy (e.g., “I will look very stupid and thus lose all of my
friends”)—and this alone may be enough to induce fears of positive and negative
evaluation. However, individuals may also overestimate their inability to obtain
social resources after a decrease in social status (e.g., “I will never make friends
after I look stupid”), or defend social gains after an increase in social status (e.g.,
“People will not think I’m very smart, but I cannot adhere to their admiration
anyway”).
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It is thus unclear if exaggerated social appraisals found in the present
study stem from individuals’ overestimation of social ranking shifting or
underestimation of abilities to cope with this social rank shifting (e.g., it is not the
social rank but perceived perception that one is incapable of coping with any rank
shifting). It is possible that in the present study, self-related appraisals are
measuring anticipated social ranking shifting (e.g., “I will gain or lose valuable
social resources”), and other-related appraisals are measuring perceived inability
to cope with such rank shifting due to anticipated dramatic reactions from others
(e.g., “Others will see me a very stupid and thus I will never gain their friendship,”
“Others will see me as very smart and thus I will disappoint them”).
The present study cannot conclude that anticipatory overestimates in
social ranking is the cause of fears of evaluation. However, it is reasonable to
assume that the greater overestimation of social ranking shifting that an
impression is expected to bring the greater the likelihood that an individual will
perceive themselves as incapable of defending or acquiring social gains (e.g. an
anticipated change in social status so high or low it is impossible to cope). From
this view, exaggerated expected social rank shifting may account for the
association between anticipatory social appraisals and fear of negative and
positive evaluation found in the present study. In this sense, it is suggested that
social appraisals can be conceptualized as exaggerated upward or downward
shifts in the social hierarchy.
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Implications and Future Directions
It is important to also address the proximate cause of such exaggerated
anticipatory social appraisals. Socially anxious individuals expect that others will
have higher standards after a positive impression (Wallace & Alden, 1997), but
may also perceive that others have greater expectations before a positive
impression is conveyed (Wallace & Alden, 1991). Exaggerated self-positive
appraisals may stem from SAIs perceptions that social standards are high and
rigid; thus the mere perception of meeting such standards (i.e., conveying a
positive impression) may result in an exaggerated anticipatory social appraisal.
On the other hand, however, SAIs may set high social standards because of an
underlying appraisal that the achievement of such elevated social standards will
result in an increased social impact, an inflated shift in social status (Gilbert,
2001). Future research may benefit from the manipulation of social appraisals
and social standards to parse out the directionality of such phenomena.
It has also been argued that inflated social appraisals about the costs of a
negative impression may stem from core beliefs regarding SAIs perception of
themselves as inherently defective and that anticipatory exposure of this
defectiveness may result in anticipated disastrous social consequences
(Moscovitch et al., 2015). This may well be the case, but the negative association
between other-positive social appraisals and fear of negative evaluation found in
the present study suggests that SAIs may continually view themselves as
incapable of impacting others impressions positively, which could possibly create
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a sense of defective self or stem from a sense of defective self, or both. Future
research may examine the causal nature of SAIs positive anticipatory social
appraisals and perceptions of self.
Importantly, most treatment studies to date have only examined selfnegative appraisals (e.g., Calamaras, Tully, Tone, Price & Anderson, 2015). The
present study suggests that although self-negative appraisals may be the primary
mechanism through which CBT reduces social anxiety, other cognitive
mechanisms through which treatment effectiveness may be evaluated include
reductions in other-negative appraisals, self-positive appraisals and increases in
other-positive appraisals. Although the causal nature of anticipatory social
appraisals and social anxiety is beyond the scope of the present study, it remains
a critical question to address due to the present study’s assumption that
anticipatory social appraisals precede social anxiety symptomatology. The
current state of the literature is such that this question has been addressed
through treatment studies and such findings are thus susceptible to the treatment
as etiology fallacy—namely, that the mechanism through which treatment exerts
its influence is the mechanism that causes the disorder. Thus, although studies
that address the issue of temporal precedence exist (e.g., Smits, Rosenfield,
McDonald & Telch, 2006; Calamaras, Tully, Tone, Price & Anderson, 2015),
these studies are inconsistent in their conclusions and limited by the treatment as
etiology fallacy.
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Treatment studies may establish reduced social appraisals as a
mechanism of change in CBT protocols for social anxiety, but we cannot
confidently establish appraisals as causal factors or consequences of fear and
social anxiety until we directly manipulate such variables. Importantly, the direct
manipulation of social appraisals has the possibility to answer theoretically and
clinically informative questions. For example, if socially anxious individuals
engage in self-focused attention to monitor what they are conveying to others, it
seems reasonable that this may be because they are exaggerating the impact
that their impressions have on others, relative to non-anxious persons. This
explanation is supported by an evolutionary account of social anxiety—that when
perceiving themselves to be in low social rank or at risk for loss of social rank,
SAIs may engage in certain behaviors that reduce chances of this anticipated
danger from occurring, such as self-focused attention and signals of
submissiveness (Gilbert, 2001). However, it could also be that exaggerated selffocused attention may lead to an exaggeratory anticipation of reactions from
others. Future research can answer such questions through direct manipulation
of social appraisals (e.g., the probability of being rejected is 10% versus 90%).

Limitations
The current study has several limitations that are important to consider.
First, SPSS AMOS does not enable analysis of the independent contributions of
indirect effects in multi-mediator models. Therefore, the extent to which
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anticipatory social appraisals indirectly impact social anxiety through FNE, FPE,
or both is difficult to determine. It is important to note, however, that standardized
coefficients from self-related and other-related negative social appraisals to FNE
were stronger relative to FPE, suggesting that indirect effects may be more
strongly attributable to FNE. Second, because we modified the original
hypothesized model, cross-validation of the final model is critical in lending
further evidence for the validity of this model. Nonetheless, the validity of this
model is supported by the strong model fit indices, particularly when compared to
relevant competing models, and the fact that model modifications were minimal
and based on previous research and theory.
Several limitations are also posed by the study’s current questionnaire.
First, the SIBS examined participants’ anticipatory estimates of social outcomes
regarding intense positive impressions and intense negative impressions.
Additionally, we cannot be certain whether we actually tapped into anticipatory
estimates or estimates of social appraisals after the fact. Regardless, the
intention of the SIBS was to reconstruct the anticipatory process in which SAIs
engage in before the conveying of a desired or undesired impression. Namely,
SAIs anticipated reactions from others when such reactions are dichotomously
and exaggeratedly negative or positive. Nonetheless, future research examining
SAIs estimates of moderate positive social impression may prove fruitful.
Second, the subscales for each of the SIBS major dimensions may be
somewhat redundant. That is, the core anticipatory social appraisals may be
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magnitude, and probability and these may not be distinct from each other, as
suggested by the high correlation between these two subscales. Due to the
smaller correlations with the subscales of magnitude and probability, duration
and self-esteem may be more peripheral, albeit important, indicators of
anticipatory social impact. Third, the current study implemented a layperson
definition of self-esteem, and not an actual validated measure. Thus, it is unclear
how participants actually interpreted self-esteem. However, the correlation
between self-esteem and the other subscales of the SIBS suggest that this
indicator is related.
Fourth, the SIBS measures positive and negative social appraisals
separately. However, SAIs may have negative reactions to positive social events
(Gilboa-Schechtman, et al., 2000). It is possible that the inclusion of participants’
estimates of negative reactions to anticipatory positive impressions may null or
cancel out participants exaggeratedly anticipatory estimates of positive
impressions. The current limitations of the SIBS notwithstanding, the SIBS offers
incremental validity in that it provides insight above and beyond that which can
be obtained from assessment of mere self-negative social appraisals. Moreover,
the SIBS has distinguished FPE from FNE and this finding was not attributable to
underlying depression, anxiety or stress.
Finally, the current study implemented a cross-sectional design with a
sample of undergraduates; thus, it is unclear whether social appraisals induce
social anxiety symptomology or social anxiety symptomology induce social
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appraisals and if these findings are similar among individuals diagnosed with
social anxiety disorder. Future research manipulating social appraisals may
reveal the underlying temporality of these variables and validate this model in a
sample of individuals diagnosed with social anxiety disorder or an analogue
sample of socially anxious participants.

Conclusion
In sum, the present study supports the evolutionary account of social
anxiety—that exaggerated anticipatory social appraisals may influence perceived
social status and social competition, result in fears of evaluation and ultimately
produce social anxiety. It may well be that anticipated social impressions are
expected to bring about negative evaluation due to the exaggerated increases or
decreases in social status and the perceived consequences of such social rank
shifting. In this sense, treatment of social anxiety may be effective insofar as
SAIs reduce expectations about the impact of social impressions on social
statuses.
For instance, if SAIs estimate that a positive impression may bring an
exaggerated increase in social status, treatment may then be geared towards
facilitating more accurate estimations in the impact of social impressions on
one’s position in the social hierarchy. Specifically, on one hand, this impression
may not necessarily lead to such a dramatic increase in social status and thus no
resultant social competition may ensue. One the other hand, such an increase in
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social status may occur, but may be viewed from others as admirable as
opposed to competitive.
Because SAIs may perpetually see themselves as existing in a
competitive social hierarchy, which may beget exaggerated social appraisals, it
may be beneficial in treatment to facilitate the adoption of an alternative
perspective of social life. Namely, that individuals are more concerned with
developing relationships as opposed to judging and criticizing the SAI—that is, a
social life characterized not by competition but by cooperation and meaningful
relationships (Trower & Gilbert, 1989; Trower, Gilbert & Sherling 1990;
Moscovitch, et. al., 2015). Otherwise, socially anxious individuals may not only
live in a general fear of evaluation, but in a generally exaggerated social world
wherein the anticipated probability and costs of positive and negative
impressions lead to inflated and untenable social shifts in an perceived
competitive social hierarchy.
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APPENDIX A
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
DISPOSITION
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APPENDIX B
INFORMED CONSENT
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APPENDIX C
SOCIAL IMPACT BIAS SCALE
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Social Impact Bias Scales (SIBS)
This questionnaire involves people’s anticipation of making a certain
impression. Each scenario involves social situations that people sometimes
anticipate happening. As you read, imagine yourself in each scenario and rate
the degree to which you would have an impact on others’ impression of you (e.g.,
the person(s) views you as funny or smart). Even if you feel that others would not
view you this way or that the scenario is unlikely to happen, do your best to
imagine their reaction if they did in fact view you this way.
For each scenario participants will be asked:
Magnitude Scale
"If this were to happen, rate the degree to which you (other person) would
feel that you are (positive or negative adjective)" on a 9-point Likert scale
anchored by "Not very (adjective)" (0) and Very (adjective) (8).
Probability Scale
"If this were to happen, how likely is it that you (other person) would feel
that you are (positive or negative adjective)" on a 9-point Likert scale
anchored by ‘‘Not at all likely’’ (0) and ‘‘Extremely likely’’ (8).
Duration Scales
‘‘If this were to happen, for how long would you (other person) feel that
you are (positive or negative adjective)" on a 9-point scale (0 _ ‘‘None’’; 1 _
‘‘Several minutes’’; 2 _‘‘15 minutes’’; 3 _ ‘‘About an hour’’; 4 _ ‘‘Few hours’’; 5 _
‘‘About a day’’; 6 _‘‘Few Days’’; 7 _ ‘‘Two weeks’’; 8 _ ‘‘More than a month’’).
Physical Reaction Scale
‘‘If this were to happen, how would this affect your (other person's)
physical reaction? on a 9-point bipolar scale (_4_‘‘Strongly negative’’; 0_‘‘No
bodily reaction’’; _ ‘‘Strongly positive’’).
Self-Esteem Scale
‘‘If this were to happen, how would this affect your (other person's) self
esteem? on a 9-point bipolar scale (_4 _ ‘‘Make me feel worthless’’; 0 _ ‘‘No
effect on self-esteem’’; 4 _ ‘‘Make me feel great’’).
1.
Your professor is talking about a topic you happen to know a lot
about. As a result, you make a comment in class and your professor smiles and
responds by saying “good point, you’re pretty smart.”
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2.
As you are talking to a person you have just met, an interesting
personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. The person smiles and
responds with “Wow, you seem really interesting.”
3.
At a party, you are talking to a group of people you just met. You
feel a little left out, so you tell a funny joke, everybody laughs and say “You’re
pretty funny.”
4. As you are talking with your professor, you realize you have
something insightful to say. You comment to the professor about it and the
professor responds with “Wow, I have never thought of that perspective, you’re
pretty insightful.”
5.
You have just met someone from your class and you have a nice
compliment you want to give them. When you see them walk by the next day,
you give them the compliment and they respond with a big smile and tell you
“thanks, you’re so nice!”
This questionnaire involves people’s anticipation of making a certain
impression. Each scenario involves social situations that people sometimes
anticipate happening. As you read, imagine yourself in each scenario and rate
the degree to which the scenario would have an impact on yourself (e.g., you
view yourself as funny or smart). Even if you feel that you would not view yourself
this way or that the scenario is unlikely to happen, do your best to imagine your
reaction if you did in fact view yourself this way.
1.
Your professor is talking about a topic you happen to know a lot
about. As a result, you make a comment in class and your professor smiles and
responds by saying, “good point, you’re pretty smart.”
2.
As you are talking to a person you have just met, an interesting
personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. The person smiles and
responds with “wow, you seem like an interesting person.”

3.
At a party, you are talking to a group of people you just met. You
feel a little left out, so you tell a funny joke, everybody laughs and say “you’re
pretty funny.”
4. As you are talking with your professor, you realize you have
something insightful to say. You comment to the professor about it and the
professor responds with “Wow, I have never thought of that perspective, you’re
very insightful.”
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5. You have just met someone from your class and you have a nice
compliment you want to give them. When you see them walk about the next day,
you give them the compliment and they respond with a big smile and tell you
“thanks, you’re so nice!”
This questionnaire involves people’s anticipation of making a certain
impression. Each scenario involves social situations that people sometimes
anticipate happening. As you read, imagine yourself in each scenario and rate
the degree to which you would have an impact on others’ impression of you (e.g.,
the person(s) views you as funny or smart). Even if you feel that others would not
view you this way or that the scenario is unlikely to happen, do your best to
imagine their reaction if they did in fact view you this way.
1.
Your professor is talking about a topic you happen to know a lot
about. As a result, you make a comment in class and your professor frowns and
responds by saying “No, you need to take a look at your notes.”
2.
As you are talking to a person you have just met, an interesting
personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. The person frowns and
responds with “is that supposed to be interesting?”
3.
At a party, you are talking to a group of people you just met. You
feel a little left out, so you tell a funny joke, and no one laughs and everyone
remains quiet.
4.
As you are talking with your professor, you realize you have
something intelligent to say. You comment to the professor about it and the
professor responds with “No, you need to do more research.”
5.
You have just met someone from your class and you have a nice
compliment you want to give them. When you see them walk by the next day,
you give them the compliment and they respond with a frown and walk away.
This questionnaire involves people’s anticipation of making a certain
impression. Each scenario involves social situations that people sometimes
anticipate happening. As you read, imagine yourself in each scenario and rate
the degree to which the scenario would have an impact on yourself (e.g., you
view yourself as funny or smart). Even if you feel that you would not view yourself
this way or that the scenario is unlikely to happen, do your best to imagine your
reaction if you did in fact view yourself this way.
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1.
Your professor is talking about a topic you happen to know a lot
about. As a result, you make a comment in class and your professor frowns and
responds by saying “No, you need to take a look at your notes.”
2.
As you are talking to a person you have just met, an interesting
personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. The person frowns and
responds with “is that supposed to be interesting?”
3.
At a party, you are talking to a group of people you just met. You
feel a little left out, so you tell a funny joke, no one laughs and everyone remains
quiet.
4.
As you are talking with your professor, you realize you have
something intelligent to say. You comment to the professor about it and the
professor responds with “No, you need to do more research.”
5.
You have just met someone from your class and you have a nice
compliment you want to give them. When you see them walk by the next day,
you give them the compliment and they respond with a frown and walk away
Johns, L. J., & Lewin, M. R. (2017). The development of a comprehensive model
of social anxiety and anticipatory social appraisals. Manuscript in
preparation.
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Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE)
Read each of the following statements carefully indicate the degree to
which you feel the statement is characteristic of you, using the following scale.
For each statement,respond as though it involves people that you do not know
very well . Rate each situation from 0 to 9. Please choose only one response for
each statement.
1.
I worry about what other people will think of me even when I know it
doesn’t make any difference.
2.
I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming an unfavorable
impression of me.
3.
I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings.
4.
I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making on
someone.
5.
I am afraid that others will not approve of me.
6.
I am afraid that people will find fault with me.
7.
I am concerned about other people’s opinions of me.
8.
When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may be
thinking about me.
9.
I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make.
10.
If I know someone is judging me, it tends to bother me.
11.
Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think
of me.
12.
I often worry that I will say or do wrong things
Leary, M. R. (1983). Social anxiousness: The construct and its measurement. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 47(1), 66.
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FEAR OF POSITIVE EVALUATION SCALE
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Fear of Positive Evaluation Scale (FPES)
Read each of the following statements carefully indicate the degree to
which you feel the statement is characteristic of you, using the following scale.
For each statement,respond as though it involves people that you do not know
very well . Rate each situation from 0 to 9. Please choose only one response for
each statement.
1. I am uncomfortable exhibiting my talents to others, even if I think my
talents will impress them.
2. It would make me anxious to receive a compliment from someone that
I am attracted to.
3. I try to choose clothes that will give people little impression of what I
am like.
4. I feel uneasy when I receive praise from authority figures.
5. If I have something to say that I think a group will find interesting, I
typically say it.
6. I would rather receive a compliment from someone when that person
and I were alone than when in the presence of others.
7. If I was doing something well in front of others, I would wonder whether
I was doing ‘‘too well.’’
8. I generally feel uncomfortable when people give me compliments.
9. I don’t like to be noticed when I am in public places, even if I feel as
though I am being admired.
10. I often feel under-appreciated, and wish people would comment more
on my positive qualities.
Weeks, J. W., Heimberg, R. G., & Rodebaugh, T. L. (2008). The fear of positive
evaluation scale: Assessing a proposed cognitive component of social anxiety.
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 22(1), 44-55. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2007.08.002
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DEPRESSION, ANXIETY AND STRESS SCALE
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Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21)
Please read each statement and circle the number (0, 1, 2 or 3) which
indicates how much the statement applied to you over the past week. There are
no right or wrong answers, Do not spend too much time on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0 = Did not apply to me at all - NEVER
1 = Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time - SOMETIMES
2 = Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of the time OFTEN
3 = Applied to me very much, or most of the time – ALMOST ALWAYS
1.
I found it hard to wind down
2.
I was aware of dryness of my mouth
3.
I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all
4.
I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g, excessively rapid breathing,
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion)
5.
I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things
6.
I tended to over-react to situations
7.
I experienced trembling (e.g, in the hands)
8.
I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy
9.
I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a
fool of myself
10.
I felt that I had nothing to look forward to
11.
I found myself getting agitated
12.
I found it difficult to relax
13.
I felt down-hearted and blue
14.
I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I
was doing
15.
I felt I was close to panic
16.
I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything
17.
I felt I wasn’t worth much as a person
18.
I felt that I was rather touchy
19.
I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical
exertion (e.g, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)
20.
I felt scared without any good reason
21.
I felt that life was meaningless.
Lovibond, P. F., & Lovibond, S. H. (1995). The structure of negative emotional states:
Comparison of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the Beck
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Depression and Anxiety Inventories. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(3),
335-343. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(94)00075-U
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SOCIAL INTERACTION ANXIETY SCALE
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Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS)
For each question, please circle a number to indicate the degree to which
you feel the statement is characteristic or true of you. The rating scale is as
follows:
0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me 3 = Very characteristic or true of
me
1 = Slightly characteristic of true of me 4 = Extremely characteristic or
true of me
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me
1.
boss, etc.).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
situations.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in authority (teacher,
I have difficulty making eye-contact with others.
I become tense if I have to talk about myself or my feelings.
I find difficulty mixing comfortably with the people I work with.
I find it easy to make friends of my own age.
I tense-up if I meet an acquaintance on the street.
When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable.
I feel tense if I am alone with just one person.
I am at ease meeting people at parties, etc.
I have difficulty talking with other people.
I find it easy to think of things to talk about
I worry about expressing myself in case I appear awkward.
I find it difficult to disagree with another’s point of view.
I have difficulty talking to an attractive person of the opposite sex.
I find myself worrying that I won’t know what to say in social
I am nervous mixing with people I don’t know well.
I feel I’ll say something embarrassing when talking.
When mixing in a group, I find myself worrying I will be ignored.
I am tense mixing in a group
I am unsure whether to greet someone I know only slightly.

Mattick, R. P., & Clarke, J. C. (1998). Development and validation of measures of social
phobia scrutiny fear and social interaction anxiety. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 36(4), 455-470. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(97)10031-6
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